In this paper, pre-IPO value estimations by the lead underwriting investment bank of Belgian IPO stocks are compared to the offer price and the stock price in the first month of listing. The valuation methods used by the lead underwriter and the estimated values are often discussed in Belgian IPO-prospectuses. For 33 IPOs in the 1993-2000 period, we find that in all cases the lead underwriter uses several methods to estimate stock value. Discounted free cash flow, which is used to price all IPOs in the sample, is the most popular valuation method. The IPO offer price is mainly driven by the dividend discount model if applied. However, we find that the dividend discount model is not better in predicting the stock price than other valuation models. Moreover, our results suggest that the dividend discount model tends to underestimate value, while discounted free cash flow produces unbiased results. This indicates that underwriters consciously underprice the IPO by relying on a valuation method that tends to underestimate value. We also find that price/earnings and price/cash flow multiples using forecasted earnings and cash flows for the year after the IPO lead to more accurate valuations than multiples using forecasted earnings and cash flows for the IPO-year. Finally, our results indicate that the offer price is closer to the stock price after listing than individual valuation estimates, although the differences are not statistically significant.
Introduction
A firm conducting an initial public offering (IPO) needs to have its stock valued before the IPO, in order to determine a price range within which the stock will be offered to the public.
There are several methods available for stock valuation. The most widely used valuation approaches are the dividend discount model (DDM), the discounted free cash flow (DFCF) method, and valuation approaches that rely on comparing the firm to firms in similar industries and firms involved in similar transactions.
Several studies examine the accuracy of these valuation models. Alford (1992) Two studies investigate specifically the valuation of IPOs. Kim and Ritter (1999) value a sample of IPOs in the US using P/E and price-to-book comparables, and find that these methods lead to very imprecise valuations when historical accounting numbers are used.
However, when forecasted earnings are used, the accuracy of the valuation improves substantially. Berkman et al. (2000) , who value 45 newly listed firms IPOs in New Zealand, conclude that the best discounted cash flow and P/E valuations have similar accuracy.
An important feature of all these studies is that they use ex post value estimations by the researcher(s) to test the accuracy of valuation methods. In Belgium, pre-IPO value estimates of Belgian IPOs by the lead underwriting investment bank are often published in the IPOprospectus. This allows us to examine the accuracy of the valuation models as used by investment banks. It can be expected that the accuracy of ex ante valuation by investment banks will differ from the valuation accuracy measured by academics, for several reasons.
Value estimates by investment banks may be less accurate because academics are more objective than investment banks, who may be tempted to report valuations that justify a high price, for instance by choosing comparables with high multiples. On the other hand, value estimates by investment banks may be more accurate than value estimates by academics because investment banks have more information for valuation available. Moreover, as the stock market is pricing perceptions of the future and not the future itself, the value estimates by lead underwriters and the offer price, which to some extent will be based on these value estimates, may influence these perceptions and therefore the stock price. However, in an efficient market mispricing by underwriters should not affect market valuation. investment bankers use, and on which methods they rely most to determine the IPO offer price. We find that for each IPO several valuation methods are used, of which DFCF is the most popular: the DFCF model is used to value all IPOs in the sample. However, the offer price seems to be mainly driven by the DDM if applied. Next, we investigate the accuracy of different valuation methods by comparing the pre-IPO valuations to the average stock price in the first month of listing and to the stock price on post-IPO days +10, +20 and +30. We find that the DDM is neither better nor worse in predicting market value than other valuation models. Moreover, our results suggest that the dividend discount model tends to underestimate value, while discounted free cash flow produces unbiased results. This indicates that underwriters consciously underprice the IPO by relying on a valuation method that tends to underestimate value. We also find that P/E and price/cash flow (P/CF) multiples using forecasted earnings and cash flows in the IPO-year lead to less accurate valuations than multiples using forecasted earnings and cash flows in the year after the IPO, which is consistent with results of Kim and Ritter (1999) . Finally, we compare the offer price and estimates of individual valuation methods to the post-IPO stock market price. We expect that lead underwriters use other valuable information besides value estimates to determine the offer price. Consistent with this hypothesis, our results indicate that the offer price is closer to the stock market price than individual value estimates. However, these results are not statistically significant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample along with some statistics and discusses the methodology. In section 3 valuations are analyzed and compared to the IPO offer price and the average stock market price in the first month of listing. Section 4 presents some conclusions.
Sample and methodology
Our sample includes all 33 IPOs of non-financial firms on the BXS from January 1993 to as well as to a peer group of firms, in order to estimate value. In some cases, value is also estimated using the average P/E or P/CF of growth shares on the BXS. Table III shows that the P/E of the BXS is used to value 14 IPOs, while the P/CF of the BXS is used for 9 IPOs. In one case, valuation is based on the average Enterprise Value/Sales ratio of the BXS. The P/E (3x) and the P/CF (2x) of BXS growth shares is used in only a very limited number of cases. of the multiple (years -1, 0, +1, +2) . In the remainder of the paper, we will investigate the estimations of the most frequently used multiples: P/E and P/CF, for a peer group and for the BXS, in years 0 and +1. When we compare estimated values to market values, we will also present results for the 'best multiple'. This is the multiple for which the estimated value is closest to the offer price. We assume that the underwriter considers this to be the best multiple.
Valuation errors are computed as the natural log of the ratio of the estimated value either to the offer price or to the market value. We use three different measures of the accuracy of valuation methods which are commonly used in the literature on the quality of valuation methods: the percentage of valuation errors within 15 %, mean absolute valuation errors and mean squared valuation errors 4 . The mean absolute error assumes that the cost of valuation errors increases linearly, while the mean squared error assumes that the cost increases are quadratic.
Results

A. On which method(s) do lead underwriters rely most to set the IPO offer price?
We first investigate the relation between the IPO offer price and the results of the different value estimates by the lead underwriter. We want to find out on which valuation method(s) lead underwriters rely most to set the offer price. For this part of the analysis, we have one missing observation, for which we do not have information on the offer price. Table IV presents results for DFCF, DDM and the most commonly used multiple approaches: P/E and P/CF based on a peer group and the BXS, calculated for year 0 and year +1 (these multiples are consistently closer to the offer price than the multiples for which no results are presented).
*** Table IV about here ***
The median error for DFCF is 9.7%: lead underwriters set the offer price significantly lower than the value estimates based on DFCF (p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test is less than 0.1%). The median error for DDM on the other hand is close to zero and not significant. The median errors for estimates based on multiples vary widely: they range from -14.3% to +12.5%. These results provide a first indication that the lead underwriters rely primarily on DDM to determine the offer price.
We measure the degree of central tendency of value estimates towards the offer price by the percentage of differences within 15%, mean absolute errors and mean squared errors. For 26 out of 32 IPOs (81% of the sample), the estimates based on DFCF are within 15% of the offer price. However, the offer price seems to be driven by DDM if applied: for 20 out of 22 IPOs (91%) for which a DDM value is estimated, the estimate is within 15% of the offer price. For the multiples estimates, the percentages within 15% are much lower than for DFCF and
DDM. An exception are the estimates using the forecasted P/CF of the BXS in year +1 (5 out of 6 IPOs are within 15%), but this result is based on a very limited number of observations.
A comparison of the mean absolute and squared error of the different valuation methods leads to the same conclusions as the comparison based on the percentage within 15%. A t-test of differences in the mean absolute error reveals that the mean absolute error of DDM estimates is significantly smaller than the mean absolute error of DFCF estimates (t = 2.54) and the mean absolute error P/E peer group estimates in year +1 (t = 2.50), the most frequently used multiple estimation method. The mean absolute errors of DFCF and P/E peer group (year +1)
estimates are not significantly different (t = 0.65).
It therefore seems that when it comes to determining the IPO offer price, investment banks generally use a wide range of valuation methods, but still prefer to rely mostly on the good old DDM. Another interesting finding in Table IV is that the multiples valuations for year +1
are consistently closer to the offer price than the multiples valuations for the IPO year 0:
investment banks rely more on forecasted future multiples than on current multiples 5 .
Some valuation methods will be more appropriate to use than others. The underwriter has to choose which methods are appropriate and which are not. The results in Table IV may be influenced by this choice. For example, the difference between DFCF and DDM might be caused by the 10 IPOs for which DFCF was used but DDM was not. For the 22 IPOs for which both methods were used, the DFCF estimates might then be much closer to the offer price than the results in Table IV suggest. We therefore also investigate the relation between the IPO offer price and different value estimates by a pairwise comparison of valuation methods, for those IPOs that are valued with both methods. The results are presented in Table   V . DFCF, DDM and P/E based on a peer group for year +1 are compared pairwise. We concentrate on the P/E based on a peer group for year +1 because our performance measures indicate that this multiple is the one closest to the offer price. Moreover, P/E based on a peer group is the most commonly used multiple. We also compare P/E based on a peer group in year 0 and year +1. All results in Table V confirm those in Table IV. *** Table V about here ***
The value estimates by the lead underwriter are first used to determine minimum and maximum offer prices. The final offer price is set in a later stage of the IPO pricing, and will include information that was not available when the minimum and maximum prices were set.
Following Kim and Ritter (1999), we therefore also compare estimated values to a preliminary offer price, defined as the midpoint of the minimum and maximum offer prices.
The results, which are presented in Table VII .
Results based on the stock price on post-IPO days +10, +20 and +30 are very similar and are therefore not reported in the paper.
*** Table VII When we compare the valuation accuracy of the different multiples approaches in Table VII, it is striking that the valuations based on the forecasted earnings and cash flows in year +1 are consistently more accurate than the valuations based on the forecasted current year's earnings and cash flows: this result holds for both the P/E and the P/CF multiples based on a peer group and for the P/E and the P/CF multiples based on the BXS, for all three measures of valuation accuracy 6 . Stock market valuations of the IPO shares rely more on forecasted future earnings and cash flow than on current earnings and cash flow.
Again, we also make a pairwise comparison of valuation methods: DFCF, DDM and P/E based on a peer group for year +1 are mutually compared, as well as P/E based on a peer group in year 0 and year +1. The results, which are presented in Table VIII, confirm those of   Table VII. *** Table VIII about here ***
C. Valuation and underpricing
We have found that underwriters rely primarily on DDM to determine the offer price. An explanation might be that underwriters believe that DDM produces the most accurate value estimates. However, our finding that DDM tends to underestimate value while DFCF is an unbiased value estimator suggests an alternative explanation: underwriters consciously underprice the IPO by relying on a valuation method that tends to underestimate value. This is confirmed by Table IX , which shows that for 20 out of 23 IPOs for which both DDM and DFCF were used, the DDM valuation was lower than the DFCF valuation. For only one IPO DDM and DFCF lead to the same value estimate. This is remarkable, as both valuation methods should yield the same value if consistent assumptions are made.
Another indication that underwriters consciously underprice the IPO is that for 10 of the 27
IPOs for which more than one multiple valuation method was used, the lowest multiple estimate is the 'best multipe': the multiple estimate closest to the offer price (see also Table   IX ). The highest multiple estimate is the one closest to the offer price for only 4 IPOs.
Moreover, for 5 of the 33 IPOs in the sample, the maximum offer price is set lower than all value estimates published in the prospectus. An example is the IPO of Real Software, a Belgian software company: DFCF, minimum multiple and maximum multiple estimates are respectively 13.7%, 38.3% and 40% higher than the maximum offer price of the IPO, which is also the final offer price. The average stock price of Real Software in the first month of listing is 53.7% higher than the maximum offer price.
*** Table IX about here ***
D. Is the offer price a better predictor of the stock price than pre-IPO value estimates?
The lead underwriter uses not only value estimation methods but also other information to determine the price at which the shares will be offered to the public (see e.g. Lowry and
Schwert (2001)). The offer price should therefore be a more accurate predictor of the stock price than the estimates of individual valuation methods. To test whether this is indeed the case, we compare the relation between the offer price and the stock price on the one hand, to the relation between the estimated value and the average stock price in the first month of listing on the other hand. For each valuation approach, the offer price should be closer to the stock price than the value estimate if the lead underwriter also uses other valuable information to determine the price at which the shares will be offered. Results are presented in Table X .
As it was found that multiples based on year +1 are consistently more accurate than multiples based on year 0, this The results for the multiple estimates in year +1 also generally confirm that the offer price is closer to the stock price than individual valuation estimates, but again, none of the differences in the mean absolute errors are statistically significant. For the P/CF multiples, the results are mixed, but the available number of observations is too small to draw conclusions.
Overall, the figures in Table X indicate that the offer price is closer than the pre-IPO value estimates of the lead underwriter, but this is not confirmed by the statistical tests.
Conclusions
There have been several studies that investigate the accuracy of valuation approaches using ex post value estimates, but to our knowledge we are the first to investigate the accuracy of valuation by practitioners. We investigate the valuation by the lead underwriters of 33 IPOs on the BXS in the 1993-2000 period. We find that the lead underwriter always uses several valuation approaches, of which DFCF is the most popular. The offer price seems to be mainly driven by the DDM if applied. However, we find that DDM is neither better nor worse in predicting market value than other valuation approaches. Moreover, our results suggest that DDM tends to underestimate value, while DFCF produces unbiased value estimates, which 7 t-values are 0.08 for DFCF, 0.34 for DDM, 0.63 for P/E Peer Group (year +1), 0.84 for P/E Stock Exchange (year +1), 0.70 for P/CF Peer Group (year +1) and 0.09 for P/CF Stock Exchange (year +1).
indicates that underwriters consciously underprice the IPO by relying on a valuation method that tends to underestimate value.
When multiples valuation is used, investment banks rely mostly on forecasted future earnings and cash flows. We find that multiples valuation based on post-IPO forecasted earnings and cash flows indeed leads to more accurate valuations than multiples valuation based on earnings and cash flows in the IPO-year. Our results also indicate that the IPO offer price is closer to the post-IPO stock price than the estimates of individual valuation methods, which is consistent with the lead underwriter using not only value estimates but also other valuable information to set the offer price.
The accuracy of the valuations by Belgian investment banks may seem remarkable when compared to the valuation accuracy obtained in other papers. However, it has to be taken into account that firms that go public in Belgium are generally mature, profitable firms, that are easier to value than young high growth firms. Moreover, lead underwriters will often have access to much more information which is useful for valuation than outsiders, and the lead underwriter may choose to report only valuation results that are appropriate for the type of firm that needs to be valued. Notes: The preliminary offer price is the midpoint of the minimum and maximum offer prices from the preliminary prospectus. One observation is missing due to insufficient information. Note: the 'Best Multiple' is the multiple for which the value estimate is closest to the offer price. Note: the 'Best Multiple' is the multiple for which the value estimate is closest to the offer price. 
